|Bibliography, etc. Note:
|| Includes bibliographical references (pages 221-227) and indexes.
|Formatted Contents Note:
|| The finality criterion -- The self-sufficiency of happiness -- Acting for the sake of an object of love -- Theoretical and practical reason -- Moral virtue and to Kalon -- Courage, temperance, and greatness of soul -- Two happy lives and their most final ends -- Acting for love in the symposium.
|| Gabriel Richardson Lear presents a bold new approach to one of the enduring debates about Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: the controversy about whether it coherently argues that the best life for humans is one devoted to a single activity, namely philosophical contemplation. Many scholars oppose this reading because the bulk of the Ethics is devoted to various moral virtues--courage and generosity, for example--that are not in any obvious way either manifestations of philosophical contemplation or subordinated to it. They argue that Aristotle was inconsistent, and that we should not try to rea.
|Source of Description Note:
|| Print version record.